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THE CODE OF THE WARRIOR, THE KINDER, GENTLER MILITARY AND MARKSMANSHIP: CHANGING A CULTURE

BY

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**USAWC CLASS OF 2002** 

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## USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# The Code of the Warrior, The Kinder, Gentler Military And Marksmanship: Changing a Culture

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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## **ABSTRACT**

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TITLE:

The Code of the Warrior, The Kinder, Gentler Military, and Marksmanship:

Changing a Culture

FORMAT:

Strategy Research Project

DATE:

09 April 2002

PAGES: 37

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Over the past few years there has been much talk and a fair amount of writing about an apparent clash of cultures within the Army. The cultures in question being the "warrior" culture and the "kinder, gentler" culture. So much has been made of the purported issue that General Shinseki commissioned the subject as one of the research projects at the Army War College. This strategy research paper examines this subject and makes the case that by putting an increased emphasis on marksmanship skill Army wide the issue will become moot. The point being that the enemy is just as dead no matter the gender nor temperament of the soldier who squeezed the trigger.

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#### **PREFACE**

I have always believed that the most fundamental skill of any soldier in any Army must be skill at arms. Precision marksmanship is dependent solely on skills derived from constant practice under varying conditions. No matter the gender, race, creed, color, temperament, nor ethnic background makes one a skilled rifleman. For that matter the projectile and target don't care about those things. It is my sincere belief that if the Army as an institution gave more credence to skill at arms and worried less about social etiquette then we as an institution would be more deadly on the battlefield.

My thanks go to the following individuals for their knowledge and assistance in this project: Mr. Helmut Hein, LTC Michael Campbell, USAR; MSG Michael Carlin, USAR; LTC Gordon Davis, USA; and the students of AWC class 2002 who participated in my research

survey.

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# THE WARRIOR CODE AND THE KINDER GENTLER ARMY

Army forces are the decisive component of land warfare in joint and multinational operations. The Army organizes, trains, and equips its forces to fight and win the nation's wars and achieve directed national objectives. Fighting and winning the nation's wars is the foundation of Army service—the Army's nonnegotiable contract with the American people and its enduring obligation to the nation.

Field Manual 3-0

## PURPOSE.

Over the past few years there has been a great deal of talk and a fair amount of writing about what has happened to the Army culture. Has the Army become a collection of wimps? Has social experimentation been taking place in the Army to the extent that it is now merely a testing ground for political correctness? Has a kinder, gentler breed of soldier supplanted the "warriors"? So much has the talk been traveling in undertones throughout the Army that for the past two years the Army Chief of Staff directed that the subject "The Warrior Code and the Kinder Gentler Army" be on his recommended list of research topics at the Army War College.

The chief function of the profession of arms is the application and management of organized, socially sanctioned force in pursuit of the nation's interests. Combat and success in battle are the profession's main concerns. Unique to the military profession is the willingness to sacrifice life and limb in the service of the state. The singular requirements of military professionalism shape an armed force's organizational culture. Culture refers to the nexus of attitudes, norms, values, customs, beliefs, and education that produce a group's collective sense of identity. Culture involves both ideas and behavior; it establishes the group's world-view as well as its normative behavior for responding to particular problems. In short, culture is the "glue" that consistently binds an organization together despite changes in leadership. Warfighting, the military's core competency, defines its culture. That culture shapes the context of the professional soldiers' understanding of warfare in all of its manifold dimensions. The ethos of traditional military professional is embodied in the virtues of physical courage, self-denial, self-sacrifice, obedience, and discipline. Its icons are those of the masculine warrior — the infantryman, paratrooper, or tank crewman, for example — who personifies the martial ethos.\frac{1}{2}

There is clearly a culture problem within the ranks of the U. S. Army. If for no other reason than the Chief of Staff thinks there is. This paper will essay to accomplish two things. First it will describe both the culture of "the warrior" and the "kinder gentler" culture. Right now both cultures exist in the Army and they clash with each other. Second it will espouse the

premise that greater emphasis on marksmanship training and good shooting skills offers a viable means of transforming the Army culture to a culture which truly places combat readiness above any other considerations.

#### DEFINITIONS.

The preface to Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations states:

"Army forces are the decisive component of land warfare in joint and multinational operations. Army forces aggressively gain the initiative, build and maintain momentum, and exploit success to control the nature, scope, and tempo of full spectrum operations in war and military operations other than war. Execution of this doctrine requires well-trained soldiers and units fueled with the warrior ethos, the best weapons and equipment available, and the solid leadership of officers and noncommissioned officers of character and competence."

Field Manual 3-0 uses the term "warrior ethos" but does not define what it is. In fact there is no official American Code of the Warrior. Furthermore, various authors and experts writing about the Code of the Warrior use a variety of terms interchangeably. Terms such as Warrior Code, Warrior Spirit, Warrior Ethic, Professional Ethic, Leader Attributes, and Law of War are all central to how American soldiers conduct themselves in battle. The first thing that needs to be done is to put these terms in perspective and to show their relationship to each other before assessing the Code of the American Warrior. The code of the Warrior is deeply rooted in the values of the society and Army that the warrior serves. Values are principles and qualities deemed valuable or desirable. The things people value are the things they will expend effort or resources to defend or obtain. For American soldiers, the national values embodied in the Constitution of the United States are ultimately what are being defended in combat.<sup>3</sup>

### The Warrior Code.

What makes a soldier a warrior? In <u>A History of Warfare</u>, noted British military historian John Keegan, tells us "The horse riding peoples, like the charioteers before them, brought to warmaking the electric concept of campaigning over long distances and, when campaigning resolved itself into battle, of maneuvering on the battlefield. As protectors of their flocks against predators, they also preserved the spirit of the hunter. The horse peoples fought to win – quickly, completely, and quite unheroically." A warrior then is a soldier who can rapidly close within effective firing range of the enemy and using the skills of stealth, perseverance, and well placed direct fire onto the enemy soldiers in order to quickly and completely render the enemy combat ineffective. This is important to note given the role and mission of the Army, to fight and

win the nation's wars. The warrior figure transcends time and place. In one manifestation or another, the warrior has been an essential element in societies throughout history and on all parts of the globe. An essential servant, the true warrior did not fight out of love for aggression, but out of a caring for others. The purpose of the warrior was and is to protect others – his family, friends, fellow soldiers and nations. Selflessness is the ultimate source of the warrior's will and courage. The paradox for both society and the warrior himself is that uncontrolled, the aggressiveness and combativeness required of the warrior, both individually and collectively, is a threat not only to his enemies, but friends alike. A long-standing challenge for societies has been to channel, regulate, and direct the collective aggressiveness and force the warrior uses to protect society so that the same force did not destroy the society. To accomplish this need, warriors have usually been bound by a code of conduct, which in many nations is more accurately described as a way of life. It is this way of life that many of the professionals of today's Army say is threatened by the kinder, gentler mind set.

## Kinder, Gentler Army.

The term "kinder and gentler" has evolved since popularized by former president George H.W. Bush to describe a more compassionate America better focused on domestic and humanitarian needs. Today the term can be considered derisive in its description of a military impacted by the 1991 Tailhook and 1996 Aberdeen sexual misconduct scandals, sexual harassment charges leveled at senior officers and NCOs, and undisciplined incidents of horrific attacks based on racial prejudices and homophobia. "Kinder and gentler" has become virtually synonymous with "politically correct," a phrase describing ideas, expressions and behavior modified to preclude specific individuals or groups from being offended. Stephanie Gutman, in her book "The Kinder, Gentler Military," asserts that the brass of the U. S. military "refused to defend their own culture; they even began to systematically criminalize the warrior spirit."

#### CURRENT CORPORATE CLIMATE.

Army Culture identifies team effort to achieve success in battle; discipline, obedience, and loyalty to a hierarchical chain of command as the essential military virtues. In postmodernist culture all values are subject to interpretation, truth is relative, and relationships to institutions, especially governmental ones, are suspect. Postmodern models for behavior prize assertive individualism, portable loyalty, and self-actualization. Diversity and self-affirmation are the corner stones of the culture. The melting away of long-held societal taboos associated with gender and sexual orientation in postmodern society have affected the essence of military life. The masculine nature of military culture, resting on men's physical prowess and singular role as

fighter, has evolved with the opening of more career fields to women. After acrimonious public confrontation over the issue of homosexuals in the military and a series of sex scandals, the Army adopted compromise measures to combat abuses and make its culture more open to prevailing social mores.<sup>8</sup>

A recent example of individualism and self-actualization was reported in the August 15, 2001 Washington Times. The author of the article, Jack Spencer, reports that U. S. Southern Command terminated its weekly fitness runs after a female officer claimed they were demeaning. The officer objected that the weekly runs "subjected slow runners to ridicule from faster runners." The complaint was sent not through the chain of command but to members of Congress, resulting in an inspector general investigation and ultimately termination of the runs. Soldiers assigned to this headquarters have no assigned weapons with which to maintain proficiency. This termination of fitness runs coupled with the assigned soldiers inability to routinely fire a weapon leaves the Southern Command soldiers particularly unsuited for reassignment to a deployable unit. Mr. Spencer further comments in his story, "As more and more of our troops fall into the hands of people more interested in social experimentation than national security, it's becoming apparent that military readiness has been sacrificed on the altar of political correctness." <sup>9</sup> This newspaper article highlights some interesting cultural differences. For instance, while it did not state that the officer in question did not first go to her chain of command with her complaint, she obviously did not like the outcome if she did. Clearly this story is not an example of obedience to a hierarchical chain of command, but rather a blatant violation of the chain of command.

In today's Army this officer had other recourse besides complaining directly to Congress. Army Regulation (AR) 600-20, Command Policy, has all manner of stipulations that commanders at all levels are supposed to implement in order that diversity, self-actualization, and various other postmodern social mores are addressed. Paragraph 6-14 not only dictates that commanders must incorporate Equal Opportunity (EO) training every quarter, they must also inform their superiors on what EO training was conducted the previous quarter. At least two quarters per year must consist of Prevention of Sexual Harassment (POSH) training and the other two quarters of the year will" consist of training that is interactive, small group, discussion-based." Suitable subjects for this training range from "Objectives of the EO program" through the importance of honest and open interpersonal communications in promoting a healthy unit climate. There are a total of 12 such topics from which a commander may choose. Interestingly enough, while prevention of sexual harassment is considered to be an Equal Opportunity subject, AR 600-20 states that sexual misconduct training is not an Equal Opportunity issue.

Sexual misconduct training is training that must be conducted separately from sexual harassment training and must be conducted by "qualified" personnel.

Another mechanism the offended Southern Command officer could have used to solve her problem is the Army's Consideration of Others Training (CO2). Consideration of Others Training is not to be confused with Equal Opportunity Training.

The Consideration of Others program does not replace existing command emphasis programs. It is not a vehicle for "sensing sessions" or for initiating EO/EEO complaints. It is a commander's program which is not limited to one mandatory set of lesson plans. Consideration of Others is a tool which commanders can use to systematically improve their organizational climate.

It is designed to create, maintain, and sustain an environment of respect and dignity throughout the Army. The program's objectives are to educate and provide a forum for soldiers and civilians to discuss issues that the command has deemed important to combat readiness. The program requires leaders to conduct classes in small groups utilizing an interactive format instead of a lecture format. The leader should be the group facilitator. The goal of small group interaction is to get soldiers and civilians to process information in the context of their roles as members of military teams. An additional goal is for leaders to be actively involved in helping soldiers learn and internalize the Army's values and accept the important dimensions that diversity and respect for others bring to mission accomplishment.<sup>11</sup>

The CO2 program is not covered by any regulation. No statute requires it. The Consideration of Others Handbook even states that there is no minimum or maximum amount of training time required for CO2. Yet, inspectors from various staffs always look for signs of CO2 training in units they inspect and classes are held around the country to "certify" CO2 facilitators. The reason for all the emphasis everywhere about CO2 training is because the Chief of Staff of the Army likes the idea. While not tagged as part of the Army Transformation process, the CO2 process is certainly having an impact on the Army's culture. What started out as the brainchild of a past commander of the Military District of Washington to deal with some situations within his specific command, has grown to unbelievable size with hardly any regulatory standards. The Chief of Staff says it is a good thing to do. He has a policy letter and there exists a Consideration of Others Handbook. As recently as 7 December 2001 an Internet search for "consideration of others training" resulted in a return of 80 Army websites. While many of these were redundant returns there were no less than 15 websites representing Major Army Commands (MACOMs) or installations. Here is an extract from a Forces Command (FORSCOM) message dated 7 October 1997:

SUBJ: "CONSIDERATION OF OTHERS" PROGRAM

1. "CONSIDERATION OF OTHERS" IS A MANDATORY PROGRAM FOR ALL ARMY COMMANDERS. THE PROGRAM IS TO BE PATTERNED AFTER THE

MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON'S "CONSIDERATION OF OTHERS" PROGRAM, BUT MAY AND SHOULD BE TAILORED TO THE SPECIFIC NEEDS OF LOCAL COMMANDS.

"CONSIDERATION OF OTHERS" IS A COMMAND PROGRAM THAT INCREASES EVERY SOLDIERS AWARENESS OF HUMAN RELATIONS ISSUES AND COMMITMENT TO PROFESSIONALISM TOWARDS OTHERS. COMMANDERS IN ALL ARMY COMPONENTS WILL IMPLEMENT "CONSIDERATION OF OTHERS" TRAINING DOWN TO DETACHMENT, PLATOON, OR SQUAD LEVEL.

- 2. AS DESCRIBED IN THE HUMAN RELATIONS ACTION PLAN, HUMAN RELATIONS IS TREATING OTHERS WITH DIGNITY AND RESPECT, INCORPORATING THEIR INDIVIDUAL TALENTS TO THE SUCCESS OF A TEAM. A SUCCESSFUL HUMAN RELATIONS CLIMATE IS ONE THAT (A) MAXIMIZES THE SOLDIERS AWARENESS OF HOW THEIR INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS AFFECT OTHERS, (B) EMPHASIZES RESPECT BETWEEN AND FOR SOLDIERS OF ALL RACES, CREEDS, GENDER, OR NATIONAL/ETHNIC HERITAGE, AND (C) ENABLES SOLDIERS TO CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THEIR ACTIONS TOWARD OTHERS AND THEIR UNITS ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION.
- 3. THE "CONSIDERATION OF OTHERS" PROGRAM IS A SYSTEMIC PROGRAM DESIGNED TO CREATE, MAINTAIN AND ENFORCE AN ENVIRONMENT OF RESPECT AND DIGNITY THROUGHOUT THE ARMY, WHILE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT EACH COMMANDERS SPECIFIC TRAINING NEEDS. 12

What this policy statement in essence does is mandate a set period of time that squad leaders must now use to teach social skills rather than soldier skills. A point of interest about the policy, paragraph three says the program is a systemic program, yet unit leaders are to tailor the program to their specific needs, so where is the system? This is akin to saying that all McDonalds hamburgers are different. Paragraph Two describes in some detail the attributes of a successful human relations action plan. The point of all this is that the policy memorandum and the program itself are both rather ambiguous attempts to do something that really is not what the Army is supposed to be about. The Army does not have a Title 10 charter to right all the social wrongs of America, rather the Army is supposed to fight and win wars. A list of attributes describing a successful combat action unit might well say: (A) Maximize the soldiers' awareness of others, affect the accomplishment of the unit mission and the survivability of others (B) Emphasizes respect between competent professionals. I believe that this sort of emphasis (perhaps over emphasis) is one of the reasons for the talk about the Army being kinder and gentler. A seemingly simple solution to this perception might be to include subjects from the CO2 list as concurrent training at the rifle ranges. While soldiers are waiting their turn

on the firing line, unit leaders could conduct the CO2, EO, or POSH training. All too often though, these types of classes are done in a sterile environment as stand alone events rather than used as concurrent training.

## Misplaced Emphasis

In addition to placing a great deal of emphasis on socialization skills, the Army is also deemphasizing combat related skills, if not by commission then by omission. The Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) is illustrative of this. Every soldier in the Army is required to take the APFT twice per year (medical profiles not withstanding). That means that regardless of whether one is a wheeled-vehicle mechanic or a staff officer at the Pentagon, twice per year every soldier will lace up the running shoes and execute as many push-ups and sit-ups as possible in the allotted time and run two miles as quickly as possible. On the surface this seems to be not only right and fitting, but non-problematic. Except, on the battlefield performing sit-ups and running more than three to five seconds at a time is just not done (particularly in gym shorts and running shoes). By the same token, the mechanic from above is only required to fire his or her assigned weapon once per 12 month period and the Pentagon staff officer is not required nor even allowed to fire a weapon during the entire Pentagon tour. The purpose of this paper is not to argue the relative merits of physical fitness nor the means by which a suitable level of fitness is measured. To assert by action, however, that three non or minimally combat related tasks are important enough to judge semi-annually while limiting weapons qualification (or familiarization) to once per year (if at all) for the vast majority of the Army certainly de-emphasizes the combat aspects of military service.

Recreational opportunities on U. S. Army installations will be the last example used of how the Army has crept away from the martial or warrior mentality of by-gone years. On virtually any U. S. Army post anywhere in the world soldiers have the ability to: lift weights, play basketball, bowl or go golfing on post. They generally don't have to get special permission from their chain of command, the hours are fairly wide ranging and often there is a soldier on special duty or a civilian employee standing by to sign out all sorts of athletic equipment for the soldiers amusement. All of this is good, healthy and fun. None of it has anything to do with combat readiness. On these same installations soldiers who enjoy pursuing shooting sports are automatically put to at least one disadvantage and usually more. Soldiers of all rank who reside on the installation whether it be the barracks or family house, are required by most installations in CONUS to register their privately owned weapons with the post Provost Marshal. This requirement is levied by AR 190-11, which states that "Commanders will ensure privately-

owned arms and ammunition (including authorized war trophies) are protected on their installations and facilities. Based upon local requirements and availability of resources, Commanders may establish and maintain a system for the registration of privately owned arms on their installations."

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While this doesn't arguably impede the family housing soldier from pursuing his or her hobby of shooting, the soldiers living in the barracks are. AR 190-11 goes on to state: "Personnel keeping or storing privately owned arms and ammunition (including authorized war trophies) on military installation will—(4) Withdraw privately-owned weapons and ammunition from the unit arms rooms only upon approval of the unit commander or the commander's authorized representative". (The first problem is that the AR 190-11 has no statutory authority to allow the registration of privately owned weapons. The registration of weapons in this country is not allowed and the right to keep and bear arms is an individual constitutional right that all American service members swear to support and defend). As a matter of practicality this is a great disadvantage. Barracks dwellers who decide on the spur of the moment to go play a round of golf merely grab their clubs from their wall-locker, closet or car trunk and go play. The shooters can't do this. They either have to coordinate with the charge-of quarters, first sergeant, or commander to get permission to get and use their own possessions, and they have to make sure the armorer is around to open the arms room and "issue" the weapon (and possibly the soldiers privately owned ammunition).

One must question this regulation. We train or should be training soldiers to use weapons systems that are capable of three-round bursts, as well as fully automatic weapons, handgrenades and a plethora of other tools of controlled violence. Yet we don't trust our soldiers to be able to safely handle single shot, bolt action, or semi-automatic weapons that any 18-year old citizen of this country with no felony convictions has the legal right to purchase? Since one is not supposed to be able to enlist if one has a felony conviction and since a golf club is equally capable of a deadly wound in a crime of passion, the prohibition on having a sporting rifle or shotgun in the barracks doesn't make much sense. That in and of it-self is somewhat telling about the kinder, gentler more politically correct Army we have evolved into. Up until the late 1950's and very early 1960's U. S. Servicemen could sign out their military issue weapons for private practice.

Once the soldiers living on post surmount the hurdles of gaining access to their weapons they most often have to travel to the nearest civilian recreational shooting facility. Suitable recreational shooting venues are a rare thing on most Army installations these days and the few that do exist are not really efficient or conducive to the various shooting sport disciplines. The

few installations that have ranges available for privately owned weapons are usually shotgun only (in which case they are very nice) or they are rifle/pistol only but at shooting distances that don't do much for the recreational shooter.

The point is that shooting skills are perishable, hard to acquire skills. They are also skills much more germane to soldiering than the bowling or golf. Generally speaking people who can shoot civilian rifles, pistols or shotguns well can shoot well with an M16 or M9. Rather than making it more difficult for soldiers to maintain their shooting skills, the Army should encourage shooting on personal time. It was just such a practice that turned the muzzle loading Army of the 1870's into the Army of feared marksmen from the Spanish-American War through World War II.

## HISTORY OF ARMY MARKSMANSHIP

The current transformation process the Army is going through is not the first. Nor is this paper the first that has promoted greater emphasis on individual shooting skills. The post Civil War Army saw individual marksmanship as single biggest point of contention; and at the center of the controversy was the question of how the Army would fight and win the wars it entered. Fighting and winning wars is still what the Army is supposed to do. Individual marksmanship was a major point of interest at the onset of the Second World War as well. As the Army was transforming civilians to soldiers en masse, marksmanship training was the tool used not only to instill discipline and fighting skills to the new recruits, but it was also used to drive home the point that ultimately combat involves killing other human beings. In the years between the Civil and First World Wars the Army underwent a major transformation that was highly and bitterly fought. The focus of conflict was marksmanship, a possibility for the average soldier only with the introduction of the rifled musket and the Minie ball in the 1850's. And during the next decade, successful military breechloaders brought even greater returns for accurate shooting.<sup>15</sup> Along with these strides in more accurate and rapid rifle fire came a fear from the career Army officers about discipline and ammunition supply. Protagonists came to believe that marksmanship was the most fundamental of military reforms; opponents argued that it bred something like anarchy. The question was finally settled by no less a distinguished soldier than General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces.

The American military rifle movement got its start outside of the regular Army. Captain (later Brigadier General) George Wingate of the New York National Guard, imported English shooting manuals to instruct his Civil War company when they proved incapable of hitting a barrel lid at 100 yards. After the war Wingate went on to co-found the National Rifle Association (NRA). The NRA went on to become the vehicle of rifle training for the New York

Guard (and eventually the rest of the National Guard across the country). Wingate also wrote a marksman's manual, which the U. S. Navy quickly adopted. The NRA also presided over the major sporting activity of international match shooting which became spectacularly popular after Americans coached by Wingate upset a champion Irish team in 1874. This glamorous victory proved a valuable recruiting tool for state troops. At the same time the regular Army had adopted a new rifle of improved caliber but did not know how to use it. Enlisted men and Officers of all grades petitioned the Army Chief of Ordnance until he released ammunition for target practice. 18

Despite this petitioning for training ammunition a large segment of the professional officer corps fought the concept of proficient individual marksmen. These "conservative" officers felt that an emphasis on individual proficiency and the ability for the marksman to pick and shoot his own targets would lead to a breakdown in discipline as well as over expenditure of ammunition. The conservatives preferred to rely on the German Army system of field firing wherein the officers estimated the range to target and the soldiers would fire at the direction of the officers (though not in volley). They also believed that artillery fire was the wave of the future.<sup>19</sup>

Despite the objections of the conservative officers, the Army's excitement over target practice grew rapidly in the 1880s. General Philip Sheridan, who had a personal interest in shooting, intensified the training by adding distance firing to 1000 yards and adding skirmishing. Infantry units were even issued range finders and anemometers. The high point of Army riflery came in the early 1890's. Shortly after it began rifle instruction, it started encouraging soldiers to hunt, showing all possible liberality in leaves for sporting trips. An ordinary cavalry trooper got twelve hours off after guard duty with permission to take his horse and rifle and go wherever he wished. Probably as much because of hunting leaves as target practice, the regular soldier, whose marksmanship had been a jest and byword among Indians and cowboys 10 years earlier had won the respect of both by the middle of the 1880s.<sup>20</sup>

In the mid-1890s the Army replaced the trapdoor Springfield rifle, a single shot, black powder rifle, with the Krag-Jorgensen (Krag). The Krag was a smokeless powder repeater. With the Krag all firing regulations became obsolete and no one inside or outside the military knew what to incorporate into replacement manuals. The Army nearly gave up shooting practice altogether. Besides the problem of manuals and training programs most of the Army ranges had to close anyway due to the greater distances achieved by the new technology. Finally there simply weren't enough stockpiles of ammunition for the new service rifle and production facilities were not stepped up to meet the demand. After the Spanish-American War the Army allowed marksmanship to go into eclipse.<sup>21</sup> When the Army returned to target ranges

in the early twentieth century, it embraced the rifle individualism advertised by early Boer success against the British. By 1909, expert marksmen were receiving a five-dollar monthly shooting bonus. But, in that same year new provisional regulations added a short course of the German style field fire to the U. S. Army's target season. The shift in emphasis would prove startlingly rapid. Proponents of German field fire were able to draw on Germany's enormous military prestige. In 1907 LTG Arthur MacArthur established a school of Musketry in the Department of the Pacific. By 1910 field fire got sympathetic treatment in nearly every issue of the "Infantry Journal." Page 1910 field fire got sympathetic treatment in nearly every issue of

The entire issue between individual rifle marksmen and field fire proponents came to a head with U. S. entry into the First World War. General Pershing sent word back from France that he demanded men schooled in individual marksmanship. He intended to drive the Germans into the open and defeat them in a war of maneuver. Pershing decided after watching the French attack three trenches without firing a shot that he could only drive the Germans into the open was with skilled rifle fire. In the end, Pershing got his wish. Colonel Alexander J. MacNab, for years the Army champion rifle and pistol shot, was assigned the task of training the AEF. MacNab instituted a simplified version of the course of training designed by George Wingate and the NRA. His training system remained the U. S. Army standard for rifle training until the 1950s.<sup>23</sup>

# Rifle Training in World War II

As seen from the last section the system for training rifle marksmen in the Second World War was essentially the same method that was used by the Army in the First. What is interesting to note is the lack of squeamishness or political correctness employed in the training manual of the day. What follows are direct quotes from that manual entitled <u>How to Shoot the U.S. Army Rifle: A Graphic Handbook on Correct Shooting.</u>

"The last war proved that if you hit a German in the right place with a caliber .30 rifle bullet, he falls over dead. This is also true in this war. It applies, moreover, to Japs as well as Nazis.

The U.S. Army Rifle – be it the M1903 (Springfield), M1917 (Enfield), or M1 (Garand)- has the range, caliber, power, and accuracy to kill Nazis and Japs. All that is required is a soldier well enough trained in rifle marksmanship to hit the enemy in the right places.

The U.S. Army believes in this training. Its rifle marksmanship course is the most thorough in the world.

Deadly marksmanship depends on correct shooting habits. In stress of battle, you must do the right things without thinking about them. You must know the correct sight picture. You must take a rock-steady position. You must squeeze the trigger. You must shoot rapidly. And all the while your sights must be set for range, wind, and weather".<sup>24</sup>

All of that is taken just from the foreword of the manual. Next we find "Today's bull's-eye will be a well-armed Jap or Nazi tomorrow. You hit him. Or you miss. For that reason, there's no such thing as shooting that is just *about* (Italics original) right. It is either perfect-or it is wrong. Your life depends upon it. By learning right shooting habits-by constant practice-every man can learn to shoot". The manual then has an epigraph, which recounts the exploits of one regiment of the 3d Infantry Division in the First World War at the Second Battle of the Marne. It depicts the deadly fire the regiment brought down on the enemy and then it quotes a letter found on the body of a German officer, "A few days later, a letter was found on the body of a German officer. It read: 'God save us from these Americans. They shoot like devils. They kill us like animals with their rifles. They are the best marksmen in the world'. We must prepare ourselves to carry on this tradition of American marksmanship". Page 14 of this manual is a one page chapter titled "Your Rifle is Better than the Enemy's". It reads "The M1 rifle costs about \$80 to build. It is semiautomatic. It has an 8-shot clip. It has adjustable sights. It can shoot straighter and faster than the standard rifles issued to the Japs and Germans.

The M1903 (Springfield) proved itself against the Germans in the last war, and is still a masterpiece of rifle construction today. It is a high-precision weapon, with adjustable sights and an effective range of 600 yards.

The Jap has an Arisaka rifle. It has a shorter range than the M1 and M903. It fires a lighter bullet. It has no windage scale. It is only fairly accurate beyond 500 yards.

The Germans are equipped with the Karbiner 98. Like our Springfield it is bolt-operated, with a 5-shot clip. But it has no windage or elevation. It hasn't the accuracy of our American rifle.

Your rifle should give you an advantage over the enemy. But actually, your rifle is no better than the man who shoots it. If you can't shoot your rifle accurately, you might just as well meet the Axis with your bare fists".<sup>27</sup>

The lessons to be learned from this little manual are simple: defeating the enemy on the battlefield is the soldiers job; the purpose of the rifle is to kill the enemy; killing the enemy takes good shooting skills; the U.S. Army knows how to teach these skills; technology does the soldier no good if the soldier can't properly employ the technology; good rifle marksmanship means learning proper shooting habits and takes constant practice. By substituting the word enemy for

the prejudicial terms used in this 1943 manual and by inserting M16, M4 etc. for M1 or 1903 Springfield, this manual would still be useful today.

## Marksmanship training in today's Army.

The nature of deployment of U.S. ground forces since 1993 has been largely asymmetric in nature. The objectives of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations defy clear cut "frontline" and "rear area safe havens." Soldiers of all Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) find themselves spread out across villages, towns and cities which are often miles from each other on a daily basis. Should the peace be disrupted by guerillas, insurgents or uniformed belligerents of either side, any or all U.S. service members may have to bring effective small arms fire to bear on the belligerents simply to stay alive. Aside from peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations most of the professional military journals and service schools are placing much more emphasis on combat operations in asymmetric environments than in recent history.

The August-September 2000 issue of Infantry Magazine ended with the following note from the editor "Wherever we fight the next war, chances are it will be a close-range proposition. We consider the infantry as starting somewhere around 300 yards out and continuing on all the way to - and beyond –the objective itself, but for the rifleman, 300 yard shots will clearly be the exception rather than the rule, with the majority of his engagements being at 100 yards or less. To be sure, we need to train for the longer range opportunities, but every soldier must be able to hit those targets that appear unexpectedly and close in. This is particularly true for combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. Maneuver units in contact with the enemy are totally dependent on their logistical support in terms of services and virtually all classes of supply, and these CS and CSS units' survivability is essential. Our potential adversaries have long regarded our support base as an easy target, and we must train everyone to fight as infantry". <sup>28</sup>

In the November 1989 issue of Military Review Lieutenant General Kenneth E. Lewi, then commander of the 21st Theater Army Area Command, stated "Training time for CSS soldiers must include training on basic individual/soldier skills (map reading, first aid, and marksmanship) and other survival skill to work and live on the battlefield". Yet eight years later there was little evidence of any serious marksmanship training going on in the CSS world. The Center for Army Lessons Learned reported an 11-month trend in fiscal year 1997 of Forward Support Battalions rotating through the National Training Center had only a 27 percent

hit rate at the Quick Reaction Force live fire range conducted at the NTC<sup>30</sup>. One of the plausible reasons for such ineffective shooting is the allocation of training ammunition within the services.

#### AMMUNITION.

Training ammunition allocations within the Army are governed by Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 350-38. The pamphlet provides requirements for training programs to include: standards for qualification; suggested training strategies for individuals and collective elements (crews, teams, and squads); and ammunition requirements to execute the suggested strategies<sup>31</sup>. These standards, strategies and requirements are applied by Training Readiness Conditions (TRCs) which are subdivided into Categories. There are four TRCs. They are used to indicate component or sub-component of units. The Training Readiness Conditions are:

TRC A - Active component

TRC B - National Guard Enhanced Brigades

TRC C - All other Reserve Component units

TRC D - USAR Training Divisions, Reception Stations, and National Guard training cadre.

Category I, the first of the TRC categories applies only to soldiers with an 11B or 11M military occupational specialty assigned to an Infantry rifle platoon or 19D or 11B assigned to a Scout platoon/long-range surveillance detachment. Category II applies to all other soldiers not identified as Category I.<sup>32</sup> Small arms training standards for Category I are:

"Ninety percent of active component infantrymen and scouts assigned to line units are required to qualify with their assigned weapon on the day record course, night record course and under Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) conditions once every six months. Each rifle/scout squad will have participated in a Live Fire Exercise (LFX) to standard within the past three months. Eighty percent of National Guard infantrymen and scouts assigned to line units of Enhanced Brigades will have met the individual annual requirement to standard within the past training year, each rifle/scout squad will have participated in an LFX within the past training year. Finally any Reserve component unit not in a National Guard Enhanced Brigade must send 70% of any 11B, 11M or 19D soldiers to the day, night, NBC qualification course in the past training year.

Category II soldiers assigned either the M16 or M4 carbine must meet the following standards:

TRC A units – Ninety percent of the soldiers assigned a rifle will have met the annual qualification standards within the past 12 months. The annual qualification consists of the day record fire, NBC and the night record course. Additionally platoons will have successfully completed an external evaluation within the past 12 months.

TRC B – Eighty percent of the soldiers assigned rifle will have met the following requirements for each training year: Verify zero, shooting the day practice and qualifying on the record course. The NBC record course will be fired to standard every other training year.

TRC C – Eighty percent of the soldiers assigned a rifle will have met the following requirements for each training year: Verify zero, shooting the day practice and qualifying on the record course. NBC and night will be fired after mobilization.<sup>34</sup>

The distribution of live 5.56mm training ammunition per soldier per training year according to DA Pam 350-38 is:

Category 135

TRC A - 1742 (counting 186 tracer rounds)

TRC B - 368 (counting 44 tracer rounds)

TRC C - 368 (counting 44 tracer rounds)

Category II<sup>36</sup>

TRC A/B - 198 (counting tracer)

TRC C - 98

What these numbers show is that the active component infantrymen assigned to combat units are allocated eight times the amount of live ammunition than active CS/CSS soldiers. At the same time the active component CS/CSS soldier is allocated 3.75 times the training ammunition than the CS/CSS soldiers in the reserve components. What makes this fact all the more alarming is that most of the CS/CSS assets are in the reserve components and the reserve components are being mobilized far more often now than ever before.

A survey of former battalion commanders attending the Army War College provided further information indicative of the state of marksmanship training and the emphasis placed on shooting skills by senior leaders. All of the respondents to the survey had relinquished command of their battalions within 24 months of completing the survey; 44 percent were combat arms officers. The remaining 56 percent was equally divided between combat support and combat service support branch officers. Of the combat arms officers surveyed 85 percent of these commanders took their units to firing ranges more than the minimum number of times required by the STRAC manual. Combat Service Support showed 44 percent of the units firing more than the minimum STRAC requirements and Combat Support showed 77 percent of the units firing more than STRAC minimums. What this illustrates is that 44 percent of the combat service support units got to shoot more than once in a twelve month period and 77 percent of the combat support units were able to fire more than once in a twelve month period. All officers

surveyed where asked how much emphasis was placed on weapons proficiency by their rating chains in a 12-month period. The outcome in general was that one-third of the rating chain always showed great interest, one-third seldom inquired about weapons proficiency and the final third never showed interest. This last point is telling. Implicit in the analysis of this survey is that two-thirds of the raters and senior raters of these battalion commanders did not care about their soldier's ability to properly and accurately fire their assigned weapons. Those brigade commanders conveyed the message to the captains that marksmanship is passé at best. With that little amount of emphasis placed on the soldier's ability to perform well with assigned personal weapons, it is little wonder that there may be some speculation on the warrior aspects of the Army. This is unfortunate. The example these senior officers set by omission was conveyed to the officers and NCOs as well as any example of commission. Listed below are some courses of action that would serve to increase the combat effectiveness of the entire Army without sacrificing much in the way of the technical aspects of the various unit missions and specific MOS tasks.

#### COURSES OF ACTION.

One course of action for consideration is to require ninety percent of CS/CSS soldiers assigned to field units go to the same six month qualification standard that Category I soldiers have. Additionally, CS/CSS units should participate in some sort of LFX that would represent some facet of their field functions. For example transportation units might do a "defend convoy" live fire where the five ton trucks are brought onto the firing line and used as cover and concealment, many CS/CSS units could easily turn a live fire range into deliberate defense scenarios and replicate the base cluster concept.

A second course of action would be to simply increase the amount of blank ammunition Category II soldiers are allocated per year and make more use of simulations devices for small arms training. Right now Category II soldiers in the active component receive an allocation of 120 blank rounds per soldier. Presently, reserve component soldiers are allocated 40 blank rounds per soldier per year. By increasing the allocation somewhere between 270 to 450 blank rounds per year in Category II soldiers/units could make use of the myriad simulation devices. The devices do provide feedback to the shooter on round placement. While simulations are not the same as live firing, any system that allows the soldier to handle his assigned weapon and receive immediate feedback will improve the combat effectiveness of our soldiers.

#### SIMULATION DEVICES

Currently there are three simulation devices in the Army inventory that could be put to much better use if the emphasis were placed on them. All three incorporate the use of blank ammunition while two of the three can be used on M16A1/2 or M4 carbine weapons. (This is essential because the idea is not just to make the soldier a better marksman, but to understand the idiosyncrasies of his or her assigned weapon.) What follows is a brief description of the three simulation devices that should be put to use in today's Army

# Engagement Skills Trainer (EST).

The EST can accommodate 12 soldiers at a time. Thus it can provide both individual rifle marksmanship and some squad level collective training. The EST uses a combination of analog and digital video, synchronized image projection, laser-hit detection, and microcomputer technology to display a variety of target arrays and courses of fire on an 8 ft. x 30 ft. wide screen. <sup>37</sup>

# Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS).

The major components of the LMTS are a laser transmitter, a mandrel to which the laser is attached, laser sensitive targets, and a laptop computer. Unlike the ETS, soldiers use their assigned rifle's with the LMTS. Each laser transmitter has two modes of operation. In one mode, vibrations from a rifles firing mechanism activate the transmitter when dry firing. A laser sensitive target then provides shot location feedback. In a second mode, the transmitter emits a continuous beam. Precise aiming point location feedback is then provided on a reflective version of the 25-meter zeroing target. At the request of the U.S. Army Infantry School, Army Research Institute (ARI) evaluated the effectiveness of LMTS for conducting preparatory marksmanship training in the Basic Rifle Marksmanship program at Fort Benning. The LMTS was found to be highly effective for this purpose. In addition, ARI has investigated the use of LMTS in weapons zeroing and has recently examined the relationship between LMTS performance and live fire qualification scores. <sup>38</sup>

# Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES).

The MILES simulation equipment allows for force on force exercises that provide immediate feedback on not only marksmanship skills, but battlefield survivability as well. Greater emphasis should be placed on Category II units to use MILES equipment to give the soldiers in them realistic battlefield conditions in which to fire their weapons. By increasing blank ammunition allocations and using MILES in Blank Fire Exercises (BFX) the Category II

units can get closer to the LFX standard than is currently possible. This technique would give the needed training without the added expense in both time and dollars for CS/CSS units to execute LFXs.

#### MARKSMANSHIP AND ARMY CULTURE.

What has marksmanship to do with the current clash of cultures in the Army? I believe that with renewed emphasis on marksmanship training, the current culture issues will fade away. By spending more energy on training marksmanship skills and spending less time on social norming, the culture gap will be reduced to insignificance. By going to various ranges (qualification, live fire maneuver, etc.) more often and employing weapons as they were intended would net the following results: soldiers would become confident in their basic soldier skills; they would become better trained in battlefield survival; and the image of the "kinder, gentler Army" would be diminished. This last would be a fait accompli, but undeniable. If a female transportation specialist routinely fires expert with her weapon, very few soldiers who consider themselves "warriors" could convince an audience that this female soldier had denigrated the Army's ability to destroy the enemy. With the exceptions of line infantry and armor battalions the amount of emphasis and application weapons system training could be considered negligent. The analogy has been made that "if Americans learned how to ride a bicycle the way the Army conducts weapons training, we would still be walking. 'Consider that most bicycle riders begin the riding process at around the ages of 3-4. They start on a tricycle and everyday after kindergarten they are out in the driveway learning to pedal. After a period of time they graduate to a bike with two training wheels. Again, everyday after school, they are on the bike learning balance and coordination. More time passes and they graduate to a bike with no training wheels. But once the training wheels come off, they aren't considered proficient. They still come home everyday after school and practice, practice, practice, with a parent or older sibling trotting beside, catching them as they fall and whispering words of advice and offering praise for every advance. Only after continued repetition and a number of years does the bicycle rider reach the stage at which literally years can pass before bestriding a bike and successfully riding on the first attempt. The Army doesn't do that with weapons. Instead we take our trainees out for roughly two weeks during basic training and teach them the tricycle part. Then they go to their units and for the most part for the rest of their time in the Army they stay at the two-training wheel level because that is the most you can get out of two times a year at a zero/qualification range." To add to the analogy, shooting like bike riding is fun. Soldiers like to do things like fire their weapons. It is one of those things somewhat unique to military service that shooting is part of it. The soldiers like to pit their skills against their friends in

competition. They also get to know one another better. Training together on an event and in an environment so different from the rest of the society builds bonds found nowhere else. It is this kind of bonding and honing of skills that creates a healthy culture and well trained Army.

On the battlefield what matters most is whether or not the soldiers to your left and right can hit what they are shooting at. APFT scores, skin color, and MOSs become irrelevant. I think that by emphasizing our common interests (such as staying alive, accomplishing the mission and defeating the enemy) rather than making it easy to assume a "victim" mentality the Army culture will change. The change would be seen across the spectrum of the Army as truly an Army of one or, rather, one Army of skilled deadly marksmen.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS.

I recommend the following considerations for change. First, I recommend that the Army completely re-evaluate the allocation of ammunition for category II soldiers of all TRCs. Going to the qualification range once per year does not make anyone an accomplished marksman. This is nothing more than weapons familiarity not weapons effectiveness. Rifle marksmanship takes as long to learn as learning to playing the violin. The learning curve comes up quickly in the equipment familiarity phase, and then it flattens out considerably during the lengthy and seemingly endless trudge to the far end. As the activities of practice are done (shooting, dry firing, etc.), all participants slowly move along the learning curve. If practice continues long enough, all leave equipment familiarity behind and move far out to form an elongated curve at the far end of the learning curve. <sup>40</sup> The bottom line is that if soldiers are to become anything other than just familiar with their individual weapons they need to fire them more than once a year.

Second, I believe that all officers should wear their individual marksmanship qualification badges when in class A, B or dress uniforms. The requirement already exists in AR 670-1, which states "At least one marksmanship badge will normally be worn by all personnel except for those exempt by Army Regulations." Based purely on anecdotal evidence most officers do not currently wear marksmanship badges they are entitled to wear. I believe that this will visibly help shape the Army culture by:

- 1. The officer corps would put more effort into personal performance at the range, as well as making sure that the paperwork on the desk wasn't more important than going out to the range with the soldiers.
- 2. The junior enlisted soldiers would not only see hands on leadership at a critical skill, but also be have a visible goal to strive for in an even competition.

3. With all officers wearing the marksmanship qualification badges the Army would have a visible reminder that skill at arms is a very high priority.

Finally, I believe that by changing the regulations to allow soldiers 18 years old or older to keep rifles or shotguns in their rooms the Army would benefit in two ways:

- 1. We would reaffirm our trust in the soldier. We currently have 18-20 year old men and women who in the course of their jobs we trust to drive heavy equipment, carry and fire automatic weapons and handle explosives. These same men and women should be trusted to keep and safely maintain firearms that they are entitled by federal law and the U.S. Constitution to own. By changing the regulation we simply reaffirm our trust in them as the next generation of leaders.
- 2. As soldiers have more exposure to firearms and the various shooting sports disciplines, they can apply the general store of marksmanship lessons learned to their military shooting.

In conclusion, by implementing these few suggested changes, I think that the Army could be on the path to end the current clash of cultures in the Army. They are not a panacea nor are they intended to be. Good shooting skills will not make soldiers better at their MOSs, nor will marksmanship training endow all soldiers with the Army values. But by emphasizing marksmanship and training on marksmanship skills, soldiers will be continually reminded what business they are ultimately in, they will learn to respect each other for the common skills they share, and they will be reminded about their unique place in American society. The ongoing transformation process is a good place to put this tool in place to assist in unifying and confirming the zero of the Army culture.

Word Count: 8,961

#### **ENDNOTES**

- <sup>1</sup> David R. Gray, <u>New Age Military Progressives: U. S. Army Officer Professionalism</u>, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U. S. Army War College, March 2001), 44
- <sup>2</sup> Department of the Army, <u>Operations</u>, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington, DC:US Department of the Army, 14 June 2001)
- <sup>3</sup> Mark J. Eschelman, <u>The Code of the Warrior & The Kinder, Gentler Army</u>, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U. S. Army War College, 7 March 2001), 97
  - <sup>4</sup> John Keegan, <u>A History of Warfare</u> (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 213
  - <sup>5</sup> Eschelman.
- <sup>6</sup> Frederick R. Kienle, <u>The Code of the Warrior and the Kinder, Gentler Army</u>, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U. S. Army War College, 1 February 2001), 57
  - <sup>7</sup> Stephanie Gutman, <u>The Kinder, Gentler Military</u> (New York: Scribner, 2000), 277
  - <sup>8</sup> Gray, 8
- <sup>9</sup> Jack Spencer, "A Kinder, Gentler, Less-Fit Military?" <u>Washington Times</u>, 15 August 2001 p. 13.
- <sup>10</sup> Department of the Army, <u>Command Policy</u>, Army Regulation 600-20 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 15 July 1999), 89
- <sup>11</sup> "Consideration of Others A Leadership Imperative" Available from <a href="http://www.odcsper.Army.mil/directorates/hr/considerationofothers/info.asp">http://www.odcsper.Army.mil/directorates/hr/considerationofothers/info.asp</a>.Internet. Accessed 3 December 2001.
- 12 "Consideration of Others Policy" Available from <a href="http://www.forscom.Army.mil/eo/co2">http://www.forscom.Army.mil/eo/co2</a>Internet. Accessed 7 December 2001
- <sup>13</sup> Department of the Army, <u>Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives</u>, Army Regulation 190-11 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 12 February 1998), 21

- <sup>15</sup> Russell Gilmore. "The New Courage': Rifles and Soldier Individualism, 1876-1918,"
  Military Affairs 40 (October 1976):97
  - 16 Ibid.
  - 17 Ibid.
  - 18 Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 98. <sup>20</sup> Ibid. <sup>21</sup> Ibid. <sup>22</sup> Ibid. <sup>23</sup> Ibid., 101. <sup>24</sup> How to Shoot the U.S. Army Rifle: A Graphic Handbook on Correct Shooting. Infantry Journal, Inc. (Washington, DC, 1943) 9 <sup>25</sup> Ibid., 12. <sup>26</sup> Ibid., 34. <sup>27</sup> Ibid., 14. <sup>28</sup> Russell A. Eno, "It's Going to Be A Close One," <u>Infantry</u> (May-August 2000):53. <sup>29</sup> Kenneth E. Lewi, "Training The CSS Soldier." Military Review (November 1989) 34-42 <sup>30</sup> Claude Shipley and Robert Burks, Security Operations in the Brigade Support Area, Feb 1999, available from < http://call.Army.mil/products/ctc\_bull/97-14/ntcart1.htm > Internet. Accessed 17 September 2001 <sup>31</sup> Department of the Army, <u>Standards in Weapons Training</u>, Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-38 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 3 July 1997) 1. <sup>32</sup> Ibid., 56. <sup>33</sup> Ibid., 65. <sup>34</sup> Ibid., 65. <sup>35</sup> Ibid., 91. <sup>36</sup> Ibid., 92. <sup>37</sup> Kenneth L. Evans, Jean L. Dyer, and Joseph D. Hagman, "20 Years of Shooting Straight," ARI Special Report 44, (October 2000): 17 <sup>38</sup> Ibid. 19-20.

<sup>39</sup> Helmut Hein, First Sergeant, U.S. Army, Retired, telephone interview by author, 2

January 2002.

- <sup>40</sup> Darryl Davis, "Unmasking 'Every Marine a Rifleman'." Marine Corps Gazette (October 2000) 26-27.
- <sup>41</sup> Department of the Army, <u>Wear and Appearance of Uniform and Insignia</u>, Department of the Army Regulation 670-1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1 September 1992) 159.

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